Nittai Bergman


Associate Professor of Finance

 

Nittai Bergman has been teaching MBA Corporate Finance since joining the MIT Sloan School of Management faculty in 2003.

Bergman’s research interests are in the fields of corporate governance, financial contracting, and behavioral corporate finance. His work focuses on the ways in which financial frictions driven by agency costs impede the ability of firms to raise capital, the methods firms use to alleviate these frictions, and the real effects implied by the residual frictions. Recent studies deal with the determinants of corporate financial contract renegotiation and the real effects of investor protection on investment and technology adoption decisions. Bergman's paper, “Bankruptcy and the Collateral Channel,” won the 2011 Journal of Finance Brattle Prize. He has published several papers in leading finance and economics journals such as the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the American Economic Review. He is a member of the American Finance Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research and is an associate editor of the Journal of Finance.

Bergman holds a PhD in economics from Harvard University and a BSc in mathematics from the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to starting his graduate studies, Bergman served in an operations research unit in the Planning Division at IDF headquarters.


Faculty Media

  • Financing Labor

    Financial market imperfections can have significant impact on employment decisions of firms. We use a collage of three ‘quasi-experiments’ used previously in the investment-cash flow and...


    VIEW
  • Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending?

    Our empirical strategy compares lending behavior of banks undergoing CRA exams within a given census tract in a given month to the behavior of banks operating in the same census tract-month that do...


    VIEW
  • Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines

    We examine how liquidation values and cash flows affect the credibility of financial contract renegotiation and its outcomes.


    VIEW
  • Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation

    We develop a model of optimal compensation policy for a firm faced with employees with positive or negative sentiment, and show that employee optimism by itself is insufficient to make equity...


    VIEW
  • Investor Protection and the Coasian View

    The corporate charters of a sample of Mexican firms show that private firms often significantly enhance the legal protection offered to investors, but public firms rarely do so.


    VIEW
  • The Agglomeration of Bankruptcy

    This paper identifies a new channel through which bankrupt firms impose negative externalities on non-bankrupt peers. The bankruptcy and liquidation of a retail chain weakens the economies of...


    VIEW
  • Investor Sentiment, Expectations, and Corporate Disclosure

    This paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their disclosure policies in an attempt to influence the sentiment-induced biases in expectations.


    VIEW
  • Collateral Pricing

    We examine how collateral affects the cost of debt capital. Theories based on borrower moral hazard and limited pledgeable income predict that collateral increases the availability of credit and...


    VIEW
  • Bankruptcy and the Collateral Channel

    Do bankrupt firms impose negative externalities on their non-bankrupt competitors? We propose and analyze a collateral channel in which a firm’s bankruptcy reduces collateral values of other...


    VIEW
  • Vintage Capital and Creditor Protection

    We provide novel evidence linking the level of creditor protection provided by law to the degree of usage of technologically older, vintage capital in the airline industry.


    VIEW

Contact Information

Office: E62-632
Phone: 617-253-2933
Fax: 617-258-6855
Email: nbergman@mit.edu
Website: http://scripts.mit.edu/~nbergman/
Support Staff
Name: Bridgette Hayes
Phone: (617) 253-3386